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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a bid optimizer for
sponsored keyword search auctions which leads to better
retention of advertisers by yielding attractive utilities to the
advertisers without decreasing the revenue to the search engine.
The bid optimizer is positioned as a key value added tool
the search engine provides to the advertisers. The proposed
bid optimizer algorithm transforms the reported values of the
advertisers for a keyword into a correlated bid profile using
many ideas from cooperative game theory. The algorithm is
based on a characteristic form game involving the search engine
and the advertisers. Ideas from Nash bargaining theory are
used in formulating the characteristic form game to provide
for a fair share of surplus among the players involved. The
algorithm then computes the nucleolus of the characteristic
form game since we find that the nucleolus is an apt way of
allocating the gains of cooperation among the search engine and
the advertisers. The algorithm next transforms the nucleolus
into a correlated bid profile using a linear programming
formulation. This bid profile is input to a standard generalized
second price mechanism (GSP) for determining the allocation
of sponsored slots and the prices to be be paid by the winners.
The correlated bid profile that we determine is a locally envy-
free equilibrium and also a correlated equilibrium of the
underlying game. Through detailed simulation experiments, we
show that the proposed bid optimizer retains more customers
than a plain GSP mechanism and also yields better long-run
utilities to the search engine and the advertisers.
Keywords-Bid Optimizer, Sponsored Search, Cooperative
Game Theory, Nash bargaining, Nucleolus.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sponsored search auctions have been studied extensively
in the recent years due to the advent of targeted advertising
and its role in generating large revenues. With a huge com-
petition in providing the sponsored search links, the search
engines face an imminent problem which can be called as the
retention problem. If an advertiser (or alternatively bidder)
does not get satisfied because of not getting the right number
of clicks or the anticipated payoff, he could drop out of the
auction and try sponsored links at a different search engine.
A. Motivation: Retention of Advertisers in Sponsored Search
Auctions
Our motivation to study the retention problem is driven
by the compulsions faced by both the search engine and the
advertisers.
From the advertisers’ perspective, choosing their
maximum-willingness-to-pay such that they get an attractive
slot subject to their budget constraints is a challenging
problem. The search engines can use various mechanisms
for the sponsored search auction as described in [6], [11]
but the most popular mechanism is the generalized second
price (GSP) auction since it is simple and yields better
revenue to the search engine. In the most simple version
of GSP, where there are k slots and n advertisers (for
simplicity assume k ≤ n), the allocation and payment rule
are as follows. The allocation rule is that n advertisers are
ranked in descending order based on their bids, with ties
broken appropriately, and top k advertisers’ advertisements
are displayed. The payment rule is that every advertiser
needs to pay bid amount of the advertiser who is just
below his slot and last advertiser is charged the highest
bid that has not won any slot. If the non-truthful GSP
auction [13] is used by the search engine, the bidders
will have an incentive to shade their bids. The bidders
would not want to use complicated and computationally
intensive bidding strategies as the bidding process is done
many times (typically thousands of times) in a day. These
advertisers generally build their own software agents or
employ third party software agents, which adjust and
readjust the bid values on behalf of these advertisers. The
bidders typically specify their maximum willingness-to-pay
for their keywords for any given day. Hence each keyword
has a specific set of bidders bidding on it for the whole
day. This scenario constitutes a repeated game between all
the bidders bidding for that keyword. In this game, bidders
who cannot plan their budget effectively may experience
less utilities and thus may drop out of the system.
We now turn to the search engine’s perspective of the
retention problem. When the bidders try to know each
others’ valuations by submitting and resubmitting bids, they
may find a set of strategy profiles which may yield all
of them better payoffs. This may lead to collusion among
the bidders. Folk theorems [4] suggest that players may
be able to increase individual profits by colluding thereby
decreasing the search engine’s revenue. Even though the
bidders in the keyword auctions are competitors, this collu-
sion against the search engine could be stable. Vorobeychik
and Reeves [10] studied this phenomenon and illustrated
a particular collusive strategy which is better for all the
bidders (hence worst for the search engine) and can be
sustainable over a range of settings. Feng and Zhang [3]
showed that dynamic price competition between competing
advertisers can lead to collusion among them. However,
in this dynamic scenario, when the discounted payoffs of
the bidders under the collusive strategy are considered, the
stability of collusion depends inversely on the number of
bidders [4]. That is, the lower the number of bidders in
the system, the higher is the stability of the collusion. This
motivates us to study the bidder retention problem for the
search engine.
Also, due to exponential growth in the space of online
advertising and intense competition among the search engine
companies, the switching cost for the advertisers to change
from one search engine to another is almost zero [6]. Hence,
it is imperative for the search engine companies to retain
their advertisers to safeguard their market share. Driven by
this, the search engine companies have introduced many
value added tools, such as bid optimizer, to maximize the
bang-per-buck for the bidders. In what follows, we describe
the bid optimizer’s role in solving the retention problem.
B. Bid Optimizers
A bid optimizer is a software agent provided by the search
engine in order to assist the advertisers. The bidders are
required to provide to the bid optimizer a target budget for
the day and a maximum willingness-to-pay. Bid optimizers,
currently provided by the search engines, promise to maxi-
mize the revenue of advertisers by adjusting the bid amount
in each round of the auction based on the projected keyword
traffic and remaining budget.
It can be seen that the decisions made by the bid opti-
mizer are crucial to both the search engine and the set of
advertisers, who choose to use the bid optimizer. Hence, the
objective of a typical bid optimizer is to strike a balance
between reduction in revenue of the search engine company
versus increase the retention of advertisers. This objective is
achieved by providing enhanced utilities to the advertisers,
thus ensuring retention of customers, thereby sustaining high
levels of revenue to the search engine company in the long
run. Designing such intelligent bid optimizers is the subject
of this paper.
There are some problems involved in designing bid opti-
mizers.
1) For the search engine, maximizing its short-term rev-
enue (that is, its payoff in a one-shot game) seems
to be a viable option. But here, the lower valuation
bidders are denied slots due to allocative efficiency
concerns. For the bidders, as shown by Cary et al [1],
where all the high valuation bidders use a particular
greedy strategy, it has been proved that none of the
bidders except the top k bidders get the slots after a
certain number of rounds of the auction. The above
phenomenon can permanently drive away low valua-
tion bidders from the search engine.
2) Dropping out of the search engine to get better utilities
in another search engine is a possible option for the
bidders. The low valuation bidders drop out after
not getting slots for a certain period of time. The
higher valuation bidders can observe this trend and
shade their maximum-willingness-to-pay or collude
to get better utilities. This may result in the search
engine losing revenue. This is a threat to the search
engine from the bidders. However, if a large number
of bidders remain in the system, the collusion is not
stable. The intuition for this is that, high valuation
bidders cannot reduce their bids sharply, since they
will have the fear of undercutting the lower valuation
bidders present in the system and thus losing out on
their slots.
Hence, we propose that retaining more number of bidders
solves all the problems discussed above. The dependence of
the search engine and the bidders on each other for mutual
benefit motivates us to use a cooperative approach in general.
The above threat model naturally directs us towards using
a Nash bargaining model in particular. Our solution can be
seen as associating the bid optimizer to a keyword rather
than bidders as done by the existing bid optimizers. The
overall model of the bid optimizer is depicted in Figure 1.
C. Contributions and Outline of the Paper
In this paper, we propose a bid optimizer that uses many
ideas from cooperative game theory. The bid optimizer is
shown in Figure 1.
• The inputs to the bid optimizer are the willingness-to-
pay values (or valuations) of the bidders.
• The output of the bid optimizer is a correlated bid
profile, which, when input to a standard GSP auction
mechanism, yields utilities to the search engine and the
advertisers satisfying the goals set forth in the paper.
• The bid optimizer first formulates a characteristic form
game involving the search engine and the advertisers.
The value for each coalition is defined based on a
novel Nash Bargaining formulation with the search
engine as one player and a virtual player aggregating
all advertisers in that coalition as the other player. The
idea of using Nash Bargaining is to ensure a fair share
for the search engine and the advertisers.
• The nucleolus of the above characteristic form game is
selected as the utility profile for the search engine and
the advertisers. The choice of nucleolus is based on key
considerations such as, bidder retention, stability, and
efficiency.
• The utility profile represented by the nucleolus is
mapped to a correlated bid profile that satisfies indi-
vidual rationality, retention, stability and efficiency. A
Figure 1. Proposed Bid Optimizer
linear programming based algorithm is suggested for
this purpose.
We carry out experiments to demonstrate the viability
and efficacy of the proposed bid optimizer. We show, using
a credible bidder drop out model, that the proposed bid
optimizer has excellent bidder retention properties and also
yields higher long-run revenues to the search engine, when
compared to the plain GSP mechanism.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II-A1
presents the details of the bid optimizer and introduces
the model. In Section II-A3, we present a bid optimization
algorithm which uses the Nash Bargaining approach for
ensuring the retention of bidders in the system. We then
map this fair share for the aggregated bidder to a correlated
bid profile in Section II-C. We analyze the properties of our
method in Section II-D. We present our experimental results
in Section III and conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. OUR APPROACH TO BID OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we present our algorithm for bid opti-
mization. The algorithm can be divided into three phases as
shown in Figure 1: (1) Characteristic form game definition
using Nash bargaining, (2) Computing the utility vectors for
the players and (3) Inverse mapping of the utility vector
into a correlated bid profile. These are discussed in the
following sections. The notation in the remainder of the
paper is presented in Table I.
A. Characteristic Form Game
1) The Model: The sponsored search auction scenario we
consider has n bidders competing for k slots of a keyword.
We assume that the probability that a bidder i gets clicked on
the jth slot (or the click-through rate CTRij) is independent
of the bidder i,that is, CTRij = βj and we also assume that
β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βk. Each bidder i specifies his maximum
willingness-to-pay si to the bid optimizer. The bid optimizer
takes as input all the si’s of the bidders and suggests them a
correlated bid profile. This bid optimization algorithm needs
to be invoked only when the number of bidders in the system
or their willingness-to-pay change. We also assume that the
bid of the player i could be any real number in [0, si].
Given the above model, we define a bargaining problem
1 between the search engine and the aggregated bidder and
analyze its properties which will help us in formulating a
characteristic form game.
2) Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution:
The motivation for a cooperative approach is the dependence
of the search engine and bidders on each other for their
mutual benefit. Given this, the motivation behind choosing
a bargaining approach is that the amount of short-term loss
(or in other words, the investment of the search engine) for
the auctioneer should be chosen based on the bidders present
in the system. The Nash bargaining approach provides a
1Refer Appendix for the definition of Nash bargaining problem
Notation Explanation
A Auctioneer
B Aggregated bidder
n Total number of players
k Total number of slots. We assume k < n
N Set of bidders {1, 2, . . . , n}
K Set of slots {1, 2, . . . , k}
si Maximum willingness-to-pay of advertiser i
Si Strategy set of bidder i, [0, si]
S Set of all bid profiles S1 × S2 × . . .× Sn
s Bid profile (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S
ui(s) Utility of bidder i on bid profile s
UA(s) Utility of the auctioneer in the
Nash bargaining formulation for bid profile s
UB(s) Utility of the aggregated bidder in the
Nash bargaining formulation for bid profile s
UA maxs∈S UA(s)
UB maxs∈S UB(s)
βj Click through rate of any bidder in the jth slot
Table I
NOTATION
framework for this amount to be chosen by the search engine
by considering all the bidders as one aggregate agent whose
bargaining power depends on all the maximum willingness-
to-pay of all the bidders present in the system.
The utility of the aggregated bidder is the sum of the
utilities of all the bidders over all possible allocations of slots
(outcomes). Now, the bargaining utility space becomes the
two dimensional Cartesian space which consists of the utility
of auctioneer on one axis and the aggregate bidder’s utility
on the other axis. Hence a bargaining solution on this space
provides a good compromise for the search engine from
its maximum possible revenue and thus gives the required
investment of the search engine.
The bargaining space is defined in two dimensional Carte-
sian space, with utility of auctioneer UA(s) along the x−axis
and the utility of aggregated bidder UB(s) =
∑n
i=1 ui(s)
along the y−axis. Let UA and UB be the maximum possible
utilities of the auctioneer and the aggregated bidder respec-
tively. It can be clearly seen that the value UA is attained
for the bid profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) for which the cor-
responding UB(s) =
∑n
i=1
(∑k
j=1 βjyij(s)
)
(si − si+1) =
U
′
B (say). Similarly, the bid profile s = (0, . . . , 0) yields
the utility pair (0, UB). Since it is theoretically possible
that all the bidders can collude and bid (0, 0, . . . , 0), we
choose the point (0, 0) in this Nash bargaining space as
the disagreement point. Ramakrishnan et. al studied this
problem in [8] and characterized the solution (U∗A, U∗B) to
this Nash bargaining(NBS) as
(U∗A, U
∗
B) = (UA, U
′
B) if UA ≤
UB
2
=
(
UB
2
,
UB
2
)
otherwise
3) Definition of the Characteristic Form Game: We
use the above model to define Nash bargaining solution
NBS(N) = U∗A + U
∗
B where N is the set of bidders
participating in the auction.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all bidders and let
0 represent the search engine. The characteristic form game
ν : 2N∪{0} → ℜ for each coalition C ⊆ N ∪ {0} is now
defined as
ν(C) = NBS(C) if 0 ∈ C
= 0 otherwise
where NBS(C) is defined as above. If the search engine is
not a part of the coalition, its worth is zero since the players
cannot gain anything without the search engine displaying
their ads. Otherwise, we associate the sum of utilities in the
corresponding Nash bargaining bid profile for that coalition
with the search engine as the worth of each coalition. This
characteristic function ν defines the bargaining power of
each coalition with the search engine.
B. Computing a Utility Vector for the Players: Use of
Nucleolus
Since there is an aggregation of the bidders’ revenue
taking place in the NBS, we map the utility of the aggregated
bidder in the Nash bargaining solution to a correlated bid
profile. The NBS gives an aggregate amount of investment
the search engine has to make on all the bidders. This
investment increases the utility of the aggregated bidder.
This utility has to be distributed to the bidders in a way
that our goal of retention is reached. Ideally, we would like
the allocation to have the following properties.
• The bidders must not have incentive for not participat-
ing in the bid optimizer (individual rationality-IR).
• It must retain as many bidders as possible(retention).
• The bidders must not have the incentive to shade their
maximum willingness to pay (incentive compatibility).
• It should be stable both in the one-shot game of GSP
and in the cooperative analysis (stability).
• It should divide the entire worth of the grand coalition
among all the bidders (efficiency).
There are several solution concepts in cooperative game
theory that one could employ here,for example, the core, the
Shapley value, the nucleolus, etc. We believe the nucleolus
is clearly the best choice that satisfies a majority of the
above properties. Since nucleolus is defined as the unique
utility vector which makes the unhappiest coalition as less
unhappy as possible [9], and given that the nucleolus is
always in a non-empty core, it is the utility vector that
retains the most number of bidders if the core is empty
and is the most stable one retaining all the bidders if the
core is non-empty. We compute the nucleolus by solving a
series of linear programs [4], [5] and obtain the utility vector
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for the n players and the search engine (x0).
C. Mapping the Utility Vector to a Correlated Bid Profile
1) Obtaining a locally envy-free bid profile for each
valid coalition: To satisfy the stability criterion in the non-
cooperative sense, and ensure truthful participation of all the
bidders in the proposed bid optimizer, we aim to find out
locally envy-free bids for each of the
(
n
k
)
possible sets of
winning bidders. For finding these bids, consider a subset
of (k + 1) bidders and allocate slots to the bidders in
this subset in the sorted order of their willingness-to-pay
values to satisfy the requirement for the locally envy-free
equilibrium. Now, the bids can be calculated as follows. The
(k + 1)th bidder bids the reserve price (assumed to be 0
here without loss of generality). The bid of the kth bidder
(who pays sk+1) is now calculated by solving for bk in
βk(sk−bk+1) = βk−1(sk−bk) to satisfy the envy-freeness.
Once we obtain bk, we proceed recursively by replacing the
bk+1 by bk and k by (k − 1) in the above equation to get
bk−1 and so on till we get the bids of all the k players. Note
that the bid of the first player does not have a role here as
long as it is greater than the next highest bid. Thus we obtain
a set of bids which are in locally envy-free equilibrium.
2) Obtaining a correlated bid profile: The solution given
by the nucleolus provides a utility for each bidder. This can-
not be used directly in the GSP auction of the search engine.
Towards this end, we map the nucleolus to a correlated bid
profile which defines the required rotation among the bidders
for occupying the slots. This correlated bid profile is what
is finally suggested by the bid optimizer, which retains the
maximum number of advertisers without hurting the search
engine.
The characterization of a correlated bid profile corre-
sponds to assigning the probabilities associated with each
of the bid profiles associated with the bidders. There exist
several algorithms in general, for finding the correlated bid
profile. But we would like to exploit the structure of the
problem and obtain a simpler solution without going into
the complex details about modifying the ellipsoid algorithm
as done in most of the work in this area. See [7] for example.
Any correlated strategy we consider here has a subset of size
k bidders bidding their corresponding LEF (locally envy-
free) bids (obtained in the previous section) and all other
bidders bidding the reserve price. Considering only these(
n
k
)
strategy profiles corresponding to each subset of size k
bidders winning the slots would suffice since they exhaust
all the possible outcomes of the underlying GSP auction.
The probability distribution which yields the utilities
suggested by the nucleolus to the players is any distribution
which satisfies the constraints that it is a probability distri-
bution, it is individually rational for each player and it must
yield the payoffs suggested by the nucleolus to the bidders
subject to their budget constraints. This can be obtained by
solving a linear program as follows.
min
∑
i∈N∪{0}
zi+
∑
i∈N
si

xi −


∑
C⊆N, |C|=k
i∈C, j=yiC
pCβj(si − bj)




subject to
∀i ∈ N zi ≥


∑
C⊆N, |C|=k
i∈C, j=yiC
pCβj(si − bj)

 − xi
∀i ∈ N z0 ≥

 ∑
C⊆N, |C|=k
pC
∑
i∈C, j=yiC
βjbj+1

− x0
∀i ∈ N z0 ≥ x0 −

 ∑
C⊆N, |C|=k
pC
∑
i∈C, j=yiC
βjbj+1


∀i ∈ N zi ≥ xi −


∑
C⊆N, |C|=k
i∈C, j=yiC
pCβj(si − bj)


pCβj(si − bj) ≥ 0 ∀C ⊆ N ∀i ∈ C ∀j ∈ K∑
C⊂N
pC = 1
∀C ⊂ N pC ≥ 0
where yiC denotes the slot that player i wins in a locally
envy-free allocation if only the set C of players were to win
all the slots.
The linear program maps the utility vector suggested by
the nucleolus into a correlated bid profile. The objective
function minimizes the difference between the utility sug-
gested by nucleolus and the expected utility in the correlated
bid profile for each player. The minimization of difference
leads to two constraints for each player. This is because for
any two variables x and y,
min | x− y |
is the same as
min z
subject to
z ≥ x− y
z ≥ y − x
In the minimization, the higher valuation bidders are given
a preference over the lower valuation bidders. This is done
by weighting each player’s difference from the nucleolus in
the objective function by their valuation. This is a heuristic
to ensure that the error in the inverse mapping of the utility
vector to a correlated bid profile is biased towards the
higher valuation bidders so that they voluntarily participate
in the bid optimizer. Since the only problem to Individual
rationality is when the higher valuation bidders shade their
willingness-to-pay, this weighing gives the incentive for
them to reveal their true valuations.
In the objective function, we minimize the difference (this
is done by the first 4 constraints of the linear program)
between the utility vector and the obtained expected utility
in the above linear program since the restriction of the bid
profiles to the set of locally envy-free equilibria may not
have a feasible correlated bid profile. The minimization is
done in such a way that the higher valuation bidders obtain
relatively higher utility (due to the weights given to the
difference in the objective function) than the lower valuation
bidders in case the optimal value of the objective function
is non-zero. This is a heuristic to ensure that the error in
the inverse mapping of the utility vector to a correlated bid
profile is biased towards the higher valuation bidders so they
voluntarily participate in the bid optimizer.
D. Properties of the Proposed Solution
The properties of the proposed solution are as follows:
• The proposed solution has the bidders participating vol-
untarily in the bid optimizer for the following reasons.
(i) The auctioneer is benefited since he has a guaranteed
revenue of at least what is suggested by the nucleolus.
(ii) The high valuation bidders are benefited since
they are offered the same slots at a relatively lower
price. Also, since the nucleolus tries to retain the grand
coalition intact, it will be individually rational for the
high valuation bidders to participate in the bid optimizer
rather than to deviate and bid higher. (iii) The lower
valuation bidders are benefited because they get more
slots and hence more clicks and their campaign is more
effective. Thus, the utility of every player increases and
the individual rationality (IR) condition is satisfied.
• The bids suggested are in a locally envy-free equilib-
rium of the game and also are in the core since the
nucleolus is always in core if the core is non-empty.
This indicates that the proposed solution is strategically
stable. In other words, no one can profitably deviate
unilaterally from the solution proposed by the bid
optimizer.
• Retention and efficient division of the worth of the
grand coalition are guaranteed by the nucleolus since it
is the allocation which tries to retain the grand coalition.
• Truthfulness is difficult to satisfy, given that the GSP
mechanism is non-truthful. But note that the lower
valuation bidders have no incentive to shade their bids.
If they do so, they may lose their slots or run into
negative utilities. Hence there is a problem only when
the higher valuation bidders do not participate in the bid
optimizer or they understate their willingness-to-pay.
The higher valuation bidders cannot understate their
valuations by a large amount since they have a threat
of losing their slots to lower valuation bidders who
are retained in the system. Also, the higher valuation
bidders are given more benefits to participate in the
bid optimizer and it is individually rational for them to
participate in the bid optimizer.
Hence this solution satisfies all the properties which were
mentioned in Section II-B.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents simulation based experimental re-
sults to explore the effectiveness of the approach presented
in the paper. First we start with a model for the drop outs
of bidders.
A. Bidder drop out model
The bidders drop out if they do not get enough slots (or
alternatively clicks) consistently over a period of time. The
conditional probability that a bidder drops out given that he
did not get a slot in a round may vary from bidder to bidder.
Also, the positions of slots occupied by the bidders in the
previous few rounds of auction could play an important role
in the dropping out of a bidder.
To model this behavior of the bidder dropping out based
on the outcomes of the previous auctions and giving more
importance to recent outcomes, we propose a discounted
weighting of the outcomes of the previous auctions to
compute the probability that a bidder will continue in the
next round of the auction. This model also captures the
myopic human behavior that the bidder’s choice is dependent
on only the recent outcomes. That is, the history the bidder
looks into, before taking a decision to continue or not for
the next round is limited. The amount of history however
depends on the bidder in the form of his discounting factor.
Let x−i ∈ {0, 1} denote the outcome of the ith previous
round. A “1“ denotes that the bidder received a click in the
ith previous auction with a zero indicating otherwise. We
propose that the probability that the bidder will participate in
the next round is given by
P
∞
i=1
γix−iP
∞
i=1
γi
= (1−γ)
∑∞
i=1 γ
ix−i
where γ is the discount factor of the bidder. To see how the
myopic nature of the bidders is captured, suppose that the
bidder’s discount factor γ = 0.95. The discount factor for
the 101st round will be 0.006 which is negligible. Hence
the bidder’s decision is dependent on at most 100 previous
auctions. Thus, the discount factor decides the nature of the
bidder.
B. Experimental Setup
Given a fixed set of CTRs, the valuations of the bidders
are chosen close enough to each other, to analyse our
model in competitive environment. The retention problem,
is fundamental in competitive environment, as search engine
needs to retain the bidders and allow them compete in further
auctions. The results indicate that the proposed bid optimizer
not only retains a higher number of bidders than the normal
GSP but also yields better cumulative revenue to the search
engine in the long run.
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Figure 2. Cumulative revenue of the search engine
C. Cumulative Revenue of the Search Engine
First we consider the cumulative revenue of the search
engine for comparing the non-cooperative bidding and using
cooperative bid optimizer. We consider 10 advertisers with 5
slots to be allocated.We run successive auctions and find the
cumulative revenue of the search engine after each auction
using the two approaches. We run this experiment until the
change in the average cumulative revenue after each auction
becomes acceptably small. Figure 2 shows a comparison
of the cumulative revenue of the search engine under the
proposed approach with that of a standard GSP auction.
It can be seen in Figure 2 that though initially the non-
cooperative approach (GSP) yields more revenue, after a few
runs, the cooperative bid optimizer, with all the solution
vectors, starts outperforming. Initially the GSP outcome
is better, as the advertisers are bidding their maximum
willingness to pay, and hence the search engine gets high
levels of revenue. However, as the utilities of the advertisers
are less in the case of the non-cooperative approach, they
start dropping out of the auction and hence in a long run,
the cumulative revenue starts declining compared to the
cooperative bid optimizer. This is the adverse effect of
the dropping out of the advertisers leading to the retention
problem.
D. Number of Bidders Retained in the System
After each auction, we compute the average number of
advertisers retained, to analyze the retention dynamics in
the system. Figure 3 gives a comparison between using the
cooperative bid optimizer and the GSP approach.
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Figure 3. Number of bidders retained in the system
In Figure 3, it can be observed that there are considerably
more number of advertisers retained in the system when
using the solution vector suggested by the cooperative bid
optimizer in comparison to the GSP approach. This explains
the reason for the dip in the non-cooperative cumulative
revenue of the search engine.
Through experimentation, we are able to demonstrate
revenue increase for the search engine in the long run
and also reduction of the retention problem considerably. It
should be noted that even though the raise is not substantial,
its impact on retaining and attracting the advertisers and
thereby other indirect advantages are immense.
IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a bid optimizer for sponsored keyword
search auctions which leads to better retention of advertisers
by yielding attractive utilities to the advertisers without de-
creasing the long-run revenue to the search engine. The bid
optimizer is a value added tool the search engine provides to
the advertisers which transforms the reported values of the
advertisers for a keyword into a correlated bid profile. The
correlated bid profile that we determine is a locally envy-
free equilibrium and also a correlated equilibrium of the
underlying game. Through detailed simulation experiments,
we have shown that the proposed bid optimizer retains
more customers than a plain GSP mechanism and also
yields better long-run utilities to the search engine and the
advertisers.
The experiments were carried out with a model that
captures the phenomenon of customer drop outs and showed
that our approach produces a better long run utility to the
search engine and all the advertisers. The proposed bid
optimizer is beneficial for both the bidders and the search
engine in the long run.
We considered GSP auction, which is popularly run in
most of the search engines, in our analysis. However, it
would be interesting to look at the effects of other auction
mechanisms like VCG auctions on the overall process.
The other important components like budget optimization
and ad scheduling are involved in sponsored search auctions.
We would further like to combine these components with our
cooperative bid optimizer.
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APPENDIX
Nash [12] proposed that there exists a unique solution
function f(F, v) for every two person bargaining problem,
that satisfies the following 5 axioms - Pareto strong efficient,
Individual Rationality, Symmetry, Scale Covariance, and In-
dependence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The solution function
is
f(F, v) ∈ argmax(x1,x2)∈F ((x1 − v1)(x2 − v2))
where, x1 ≥ v1 and x2 ≥ v2 and the point v = (v1, v2)
is known as the point of disagreement. There are several
possibilities for choosing the disagreement point v. The three
popular choices are those based on (1) a minimax criterion,
(2) focal equilibrium, and (3) rational threats. As part of this
paper, we use the rational threats to identify disagreement
point v [5]. For more details please refer to the books [5]
[9].

